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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SCARCITY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORM-

two recent cases, prospective
purchasers entered into written contracts with local automobile distributors for the
purchase of new cars. Because of the scarcity of new cars, the prospective purchasers' names were put on waiting lists establishing a priority for delivery
as new cars were received by the distributors. In both cases the distributors refused
without excuse to perform when cars became available for delivery. The prospective purchasers sought specific performance on the basis that the current
scarcity of new cars and the difficulty of obtaining them elsewhere for cash alone
made the legal damage remedy inadequate. Held, (a) specific performance
granted. Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., (Kan. 1948) 199 P. (2d) 481, (b)
ANCE OF CoNI'RACT FOR PURCHASE OF NEw CAR-In
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specific performance denied. McCallister 11. Patton, (Ark. 1948) 215 S.W. (2d)
701.
The reluctance of equity to grant specific performance of a contract for the
purchase of chattels,1 while granting it freely for contracts involving interests in
land, is traditional.2 Unless the chattel contracted for has such special and
peculiar qualities as to meet the vague requirement of "uniqueness," so that a
legal damage3 remedy would be clearly inadequate,4 equity will not intervene.
The recent inBation and shortage of consumer goods have raised anew the question
of what constitutes "uniqueness,"5 and cases concerning contracts for purchase of new cars have been an apt vehicle for re-investigation of the problem.
The courts are not wholly in agreement, as is evidenced by the principal cases.
However, only a very few recent cases6 have held that scarcity of the subject
matter of the contract, and the difficulty of securing a substitute on the market
for the same cost, will make the chattel "unique."7 Thus, there seems to be no
appreciable tendency on the part of modem equity courts to relax the strict
1 When a contract involves land as well as chattels, specific performance of the entire
contract is usually available. 152 A.L.R. 4 at 16 (1944). Regardless of the subject matter,
specific performance is freely given if the contract presents an independent basis of equity
jurisdiction. L.R.A. 1918E 609.
2 Originally, the basic requirement for specific performance was a showing of inadequacy
of the legal remedy. As the legal remedy was more often found inadequate in regard to land
contracts, some equity courts have tended to think in terms of the subject matter of the
contract. To the effect that the law of specific performance primarily relates to realty contracts. see Gallagher v. Studebaker Ccirp., 236 Mich. 195, 210 N.W. 233 (1926).
8 If, under the contract, title has already passed to the purchaser, equity may refuse to act
on the ground that the legal remedies for the protection of property interests are adequate.
152 A.L.R. 4 at 42 (1944).
4 When dealing with chattel contracts, equity will require clear inadequacy, despite the
commonly stated rule [see, e.g., Elk Relining Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., 92 W.Va.
479, 115 S.E. 431 (1922)] that "the remedy at law must be plain and adequate, and as
certain, prompt, complete, practicable and efficient to attain the ends of justice and its prompt
administration as the equity remedy sought." For discussion of factors considered in determining adequacy of the damage remedy, see 152 A.L.R. 4 at 20 (1944); 2 CoNTRAcrs RESTATEMENT, §361 (1932).
5 Scarcity does not constitute "uniqueness," because the special quality must be of significance to plaintiff alone and not to the world in general. Kalmon v. Thornton-Fuller Co.,
62 Pa. D & C 397 (1948).
6 Subsequent to the principal cases, a Missouri intermediate court granted specific performance on similar facts on the authority of the Heidner case. Boeving v. Vandover, (Mo.
App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 175.
'
7 The only case found prior to the first principal case granting specific performance of
a contract for the purchase of a new car on the basis of scarcity is De Moss v. Conart Motor
Sales, Inc., 34 Ohio L. R. 535; 72 N.E. (2d) 158 (1947). In a similar situation, without
ruling on the availability of specific performanc-e. a constructive trust was imposed on the
distributor in Maas v. Weitzman, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 300 (1947). Where the contract was
for a specific type of copper and brass, specific performance on the ground of scarcity was
granted in Oreland Equipment Co. v. Copco Steel and Engineering Corp., 310 Mich. 61, 16
N.W. (2d) 646 (1944 ). In support of the second principal case, see Kirsch v. Zubalsky, 139
N.T. Eq. 22, 49 A. (2d) 773 (1946); Poltorak v. Jackson Chevrolet Co., (Mass. 1948), 79
N.E. (2d) 285; Welch v. Chippew.a Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 31 N.W. (2d) 170 (1948);
Hysock v. Palenno, 57 Pa. D & C 253 (1948); Griscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 31 S.E.
(2d) 309 (1944).
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requirements governing specific performance of chattel contracts. 8 Furthermore,
the adoption by thirty-five states0 of the Uniform Sales Act has not tended to
increase the availability of specific performance for chattel contracts, as was
anticipated. 10 Although the act does not speak in terms of either "uniqueness" or
"inadequacy,"11 the prevailing view12 is that it merely codifies existing equity
practice without adding any new powers.13 Thus it appears that the conscience
of equity has so far crystallized that a promisee under a contract for a somewhat
standardized chattel will rarely be able to secure specific performance.14 This is
true despite the scarcity of the chattel and the superior equities of the promisee
as compared to a promisor who is usually guilty of bad faith and suffering no
legal hardship. It seems questionable whether this strictness serves the ends of
justice.15 By relegating a promisee to a damage remedy, which neither gives him
what he bargained for nor compensates him for the inconveniences suffered,16
while leaving the promisor relatively free to perform if he wishes, a premium is
placed on contractual insincerity.17
Richard H. Conn
8 The statement made in Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114, 115 (1917), that
there is such a tendency, aside from the influence of statutes, is not supported by the cases.
9 Arkansas has adopted the Sales Act while Kansas has not. However, the court in the
principal Arkansas case did not refer to the act.
10 The draftsmen of the Sales Act believed it would enlarge the number of cases where
specific performance is allowed. 3 WILLISTON, SALES, rev. ed., §601 (1948). But see
Masterson, "Specific Performance of Contracts to Deliver Ascertained Goods," EssAYS IN
HoNOR oF 0. K. McMuRRARY 439 (1935).
11 Sec. 68 states that an equity court may, "if it sees fit," decree specific performance 0£
a contract for "specific or ascertained" goods.
12 Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 481 (1946). Contra, Hughbanks
v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114 (1917).
13 In fact, it seelilS to have had the opposite effect. Generally a greater degree of cer- •
tainty in the terms of the contract will be required for specific performance than for damages
for its breach. 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §370 (1932). Courts have interpreted sec. 68's
requirement of "specific or ascertained" goods as imposing even stricter requirements. Contracts for sale of new cars, involving somewhat fungible future goods, are particularly susceptible to challenge for failure to satify this requirement; specific performance has been
denied in several cases on this basis. See Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 65 N.Y.S. (2d)
481 (1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 65 N.Y:S. (2d) 576 (1946); Daub v. Henry
Caplan, Inc., 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 837 (1946); Gellis v. Falcon Buick Co., Inc., 76 N.Y.S. (2d)
94 (1947); Kalmon v. Thornton-Fuller Co., 62 Pa. D & C 397 (1948).
14 See cases collected in 152 A.L.R. 4 (1944).
15 The argument that the innocent, rather than the guilty, party should have the election
of getting damages at law or specific performance is not new. See 2 STORY, EQUITY JumsPRUDENCE, 13th ed., §717a (1886). There seelilS to be no inherent reason for the courts'
strictness. Specific performance of chattel contracts is granted freely in Europe and Scotland.
3 WILLISTON, SALES, rev. ed., §601 0948).
16 Specific performance of a c011tract to purchase a new car was denied on the basis
that the promisor had an adequate remedy at law, namely, the recovery of nominal damages.
Kalmon v. Thornton-Fuller Co., 62 Pa. D & C 397 (1948). See 1946 Wis. L. Rev. 461. Cf.
Boeving v. Vandover, note 6, supra, decreeing that the distributor deliver the new 1946 car
contracted for, or, in lieu thereof, a 1947, 1948 or 1949 car of the same make and model at
the 1946 contract price.
1 7 Brown v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 84 W.Va. 271, 99 S.E. 457 (1919).

